Crisis Caused Changes in Intrinsic Liquidity Value in Non-Profit Institutions by Michalsky, Grzegorz
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Crisis Caused Changes in Intrinsic
Liquidity Value in Non-Profit Institutions
Grzegorz Michalsky
Wroclaw University of Economics
1. December 2012
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43397/
MPRA Paper No. 43397, posted 24. December 2012 03:49 UTC
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2189488
 
Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy, 2012, Volume 7 Issue 2, ISSN: 1689-765X 





Grzegorz Michalski PhD 
Wroclaw University of Economics 
Komandorska 118/120, p.Z-2, KFPiZW 






ABSTRACT: Liquid assets which nonprofit institutions holds are not a 
source of any special interests and although the close to cash assesses together 
with credit lines available for nonprofit institution are connected with 
resigning from realization of the part of incomes or costs, nonprofit 
institutions decide to hold some liquidity reserves. And not only this resulting 
from transactional needs, but also from precautional and speculative reasons. 
Investment in liquid reserves resulting from speculative demand for money 
may be assessed by usage of capital budgeting methods. In the paper, each of 
these aspects of liquidity was taken into consideration and presented from 
nonprofit perspective. Nonprofit liquidity value determination may often 
significantly contribute to the solution of working capital management 
problems in these institutions. 
 
KEY WORDS: Intrinsic liquidity value, Nonprofit financial management, 
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Introduction 
Social economy institutions can work as taxed commercial businesses or 
as non-taxed nonprofit institutions (Michalski 2011, Lane, Longstreth, Nixon, 
2001, p. 1-17). The advantage of commercially driven institutions are more 
effective managed than government controlled ones (Nowicki 2004, p. 29). In 
that paper the nonprofit institution liquidity management model is analyzed. 
That is done in the context of three basic different situations by comparison 
of: non-taxed government controlled institution, non-taxed nonprofit 
institution and taxed commercially managed business (Berger, 2008, p. 46-
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47). The after-crisis weaker economic situation, cause that many nonprofit 
institutions, face on the one side, smaller cash inflows and financing 
possibilities and on the other side higher demand on their services. After the 
crisis, that institutions face specific incumbent needs, which are the result of 
higher unemployment and other similar factors (Zietlow, 2010, p. 238-248).  
The nonprofit institution differ from for-profit institutions, because their 
basic aim, is not the maximization of institution value, but the best realization 
of their mission (Zietlow, Hankin, Seidner, 2007, p. 6-7). But for assessment 
of financial decision nonprofit institution, should be used analogous rules like 
for for-profit institutions (Brigham, Gapenski, 2000, p. 524-536). The rules 
teach, the higher risk is, the higher cost of capital rate should be used to 
evaluate the future results of current decision. Of course, that is also positively 
linked with the level of efficiency and effectiveness in realization of the 
nonprofit institution mission. Cost of financing net liquid assets (working 
capital) depends on the risk included to the institution strategy of financing 
and/or investment in liquidity.  
The value which could be attributed to liquidity for nonprofit institution 
depends on the current liquidity needs of the nonprofit institution. Managing 
team in nonprofit institutions have a lot of important reasons for which their 
institution should possess some high liquid resources reserves even if current  
interest rate is positive (Kim 1998). The reasons may be classified into three 
main groups: (1) transactional reason as the result of the necessity of current 
expenses financing, (2) precautional reason as the result of fear of future cash 
flows uncertainty, (3) so called speculative reason, as the result of the future 
interest rate level uncertainty.  
 
Liquid assets like money resources in institution safe is not a source of any 
or small interests.  Maintaining liquidity reserve in the nonprofit institution is 
a result of belief that the value of lost income on account of interest will be 
recompensed by the benefits for incumbents of nonprofit institution (Kim 
1998, Lee 1990). The hypothetical benefits are from higher profitability that 
institution mission will be completed, thanks adequate liquidity level. Then 
institutions maintaining such reserves assume that in equilibrium conditions, 
marginal liquidity value is equal to the interest rate of the Treasury Bonds 
investments (or interest rate being a cost of short-term credit we took out to 
obtain liquidity. Without doubt, the statement that liquidity does not bring any 
benefits may be rejected at once. From such a perspective, liquidity would be 
treated as a ”necessary evil” linked only to the costs resulting from interests 
lost. Another incorrect conclusion would be an assumption that present net 
value always equals zero. It would be a result of the statement that due to the 
fact that marginal liquidity value is always equal to interests lost, cash 
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reserves size has no significance at all (Henderson 1989, p. 95; Kim 1998, Lee 
1990, p. 540). 
For institution being in possession of liquid reserves, the marginal utility 
of liquidity changes. Along with the growth in amount of cash possessed, the 
marginal cash value decreases. So it may be noticed that for the market 
Treasury Bond rate or short-term credit rate, it pays to keep some money 
reserve only to the specific level. There is a point corresponding with the 
optimal (critical) liquidity level, up to which the amount of liquid assesses in 
the nonprofit institution may be increased at a profit (Washam 1989, p.28;  
Henderson 1989, Lee 1990). The term: liquidity degree (or level) is connected 
with the known from economic literature conception of “liquidity container”. 
The more liquid assesses (which may be easily convertible into known 
amount of money resources and sensible only to a slight value change risk), 
the higher is nonprofit institution liquidity level.  
After crossing this critical liquidity level, the Treasury Bonds sale or 
taking out a short-term debt is unprofitable for the nonprofit institution. The 
marginal benefit from higher cash reserve is lower than the cost of interests 
lost  (Rast 2000, Washam 1989; Henderson 1989).  
 
Nonprofit institutions liquidity definition 
In economic literature liquidity is defined in many various ways. It is 
understood as an nonprofit institution solvency i.e. ability to regulate its 
obligations that result from usual transactions, unexpected events or situations 
enabling ”bargain” purchase of goods  (Henderson 1989, Lee 1990).  On the 
other hand,  liquidity is considered as a transaction space on the financial 
market. It occurs when there is a ”liberty” of carrying out ”huge” sale or 
purchase transactions on the market, with no fear that you will not find 
appropriate demand or supply.  Another popular definition of liquidity its 
description as an assesses convertibility into other assesses. In other words, 
liquidity is an easiness of carrying out the exchange transactions with low 
transaction costs.  
There are important connections among these three looks on liquidity. If 
there appears the necessity of regulating an obligation exceeding cash reserves 
in nonprofit institution possession, the possibility of repayment depends on 
whether it is possible to exchange assesses possessed for cash or not. If so, it 
will be paid off on time. At the same time, the possibility of such an exchange 
depends on the capacity of the nonprofit institution assesses market. It means 
that the ability to regulate nonprofit institution obligations (short-term 
solvency) is dependent on the capacity of the market of assesses constituting 
nonprofit institution reserves (or more generally: its property). Financial 
liquidity is therefore an internal category of the nonprofit institution, 
influenced both by the managing team and other factors occurring inside the 
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nonprofit institution or in its surroundings. The long-term liquidity is totally 
disregarded here  (Washam 1989, Henderson 1989, Lee 1990).  
We will understand nonprofit institution financial liquidity as liquid 
assesses reserve, which may be used in order to carry out transaction 
without any time or financial loss resulting from normal operational activity 
(transactional liquidity) or because of unexpected needs (precautional 
liquidity) or because of attractive profit opportunities expectations 
(speculative liquidity) (Washam 1989, Beck 1993, Lee 1990). 
The nonprofit institution transactional and precautional liquidities on 
sufficient level enable prompt fulfillment of internal (salary payments etc.) 
and external creditors (suppliers payment etc.). The nonprofit institution 
financial liquidity (operational and precautional) usually concerns operational 
activity and is not linked to investment activity.  If it comes to enfeeblement 
or loss of operational and precautional liquidity in the nonprofit institution, it 
menaces with  (Scherr 1989, Washam 1989, Beck 1993): (a) lowering 
decision making elasticity,  (b) deteriorating nonprofit institution ability to set 
the institution mission, (c) higher foreign capital raising cost,  (d) 
demobilization of donors,  (e) worsening nonprofit institution position.  
In order to avoid such dangers, constant monitoring of nonprofit institution 
financial liquidity is necessary, and then taking actions guaranteeing its 
economic-financial equilibrium.  
 
Option value of liquidity in nonprofit institutions 
Liquid resources resulting from the “speculative” liquidity demand may 
bring some benefits, but do not have to. As we can see, liquidity exceeding 
the everyday transactions demand, provides the nonprofit institution with an 
option to take up unexpected projects worth realization to better realization of 
the mission (Washam 1989, Beck 1993). Keeping an access to liquidity that 
exceeds transactional needs, the nonprofit institution is in possession of call 
option.  
If in the period when the nonprofit institution possesses speculative 
liquidity sources, there appears purchase possibility of assesses which normal 
long-term value amounts to 8 thousand euros and at the given moment, they 
can be purchased for 3 thousand euros, the NPV of such a “project” will come 
to 5 thousand euros. If nonprofit institution possesses the required money 
reserves, it will have benefit of 5 thousand euros. If the nonprofit institution 
has not the access to additional liquidity – it will lose the possibility of 
investment project realization together with 5 thousand euros.  Typical 
options have a value equal to the assesses value reduced by the price of 
realization and option price. If purchased assesses value exceeds the sum of 
those two quantities, speculative liquidity reserves generates profits equal to 
NPV of the project taken. It is about the situation while the speculative 
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reserves are being used, i.e. when operational net cash flows is not sufficient 
to cover costs resulting from taking up the investment (Scherr 1989, Washam 
1989, Beck 1993). In other case, there is no profit from additional liquidity 
resources doming from speculative demand.  
Option liquidity value is dependent on 6 factors (Beck 1993). First of them 
is the present net value project value. If the potential project profitability 
increases, the value of project taking option will increase as well. Another 
factor determining liquidity value is the nonprofit institution cash flow.  If 
other factors are constant, option value will increase along with the decrease 
of operational cash flows level, and will fall together with those flows level 
increase.  
It is because, along with increased operational cash flow level, the 
probability that the unexpected investment project cost will be covered with 
those flows increases too. Therefore, the probability of using additional 
liquidity linked to speculative demand is decreased. The third and the forth 
factor determining option liquidity value is the cash flows and project cost 
changeability.  
If operational cash flows changeability increases, we are faced with lower 
probability of using additional speculative liquidity – and therefore the option 
liquidity value decreases. The probability of using additional liquidity 
decreases along with increase in project cost changeability. Such increase in 
changeability is also accompanied with the diminishing project profitability.  
The other factors influencing the option liquidity value are: interest rate 
and the correlation between operational cash flows and costs. If interest rate 
increases, present project value will decrease, and then – option liquidity 
value will decrease as well.  But correlation between operational cash flows 
and costs is quite different. If this correlation increases, option liquidity value 
will increase too. It results from the fact that the probability of using to take 
up the investment some operational cash flows omitting liquid speculative 
reserves will be decreased then (Hill 1995, Puxty 1992).  
 
Nonprofit institution optimal liquidity level fixed on the basis of 
conception of value of liquidity 
Increasing liquidity level has sense only to a specific optimal quantity 
(Michalski 2011b).  It results from the current market liquidity value (short-
term deposit interest rate or short-term credit interest rate available for a 
nonprofit institution). The point to which nonprofit institution liquidity level 
may be increased at a benefits for incumbents of the nonprofit institution, 
results from. From equalizing of market liquidity value and internal nonprofit 





mopti vppV )(  (1) 
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where: Vi(ppopt) – internal liquidity value corresponding to the optimal 
nonprofit institution financial liquidity value.  
 
After crossing his optimal liquidity level (pp
opt
) increased liquidity (e.g. by 
abandoning to deposit the resources and/or liquidation of existing deposits, or 
taking short-term debt) is uneconomic for the nonprofit institution. That 
unprofitability among other things results from the fact that marginal utility of 
higher financial liquidity level is lower than the cost of lost interests benefits. 
This cost arises as a result of the loss of open deposit interest linked profits in 
case of resignation from depositing the sources or unnecessarily incurred 
financial costs if the nonprofit institution uses “unnecessary” outside 
financing. Optimal financial liquidity level (pp
opt
) being a result of comparing 
the market liquidity level v
m
, available for a nonprofit institution and the 





The following conditions are implied by these fact: carrying out 
investment 2., taking up the credit 3., and equilibrium 4. 
carrying out investment condition:   mi vv   (2) 
taking up the credit condition: mi vv   (3) 
equilibrium condition (optimal liquidity level): mi vv   (4) 
where:  v
i
 – internal financial liquidity value in the nonprofit institution, 
v
m
 – market financial liquidity value (available for the nonprofit 
institution). 
 
Example: Nonprofit institution has a short-term credit of bank at its 
disposal. v
m
  is the cost of this credit. If the nonprofit institution management 
estimates that the internal liquidity value amounts to: v
i
, it will delay taking 
the credit until the internal liquidity value v
i
 will be higher than market value 
v
m
. When these two values become equal, nonprofit institution financial 
liquidity value will reach the optimal value. But whereas v
i
 exceeds the v
m
 
level, the nonprofit institution will demand external financing.  
Current finance management begins with determining the optimal liquidity 
level because it guarantees the best effects (McMenamin 1999). In order to 
determine his level information abort internal liquidity value is needed (abort 
the course of the curve representing it) and nonprofit institution market 
liquidity value must be known too.  
Financing of the liquidity has its cost depending on risk linked with 
liquidity strategies used by the financed institution. If we have higher risk, we 
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will have higher cost of financing (cost of capital) and as result other 
financially measured effects of nonprofit institution.  
Cost of financing of liquidity depends on kind of financing, next on level 
of liquidity in relation to sales and last but not least danger for nonprofit 
institution mission caused by risk exposition.  
Choosing between various levels of liquidity in relation to sales, we use 
one from three strategies: (RES) restrictive strategy when for realization of 
the mission of nonprofit institution we use the most risky but the cheapest, the 
smallest as possible, level of liquidity, (MOD) moderate strategy when for 
realization of the mission of nonprofit institution we moderate between risk 
and costs of holding liquidity, and (FLX) flexible strategy when for 
realization of the mission of nonprofit institution we use the most expensive 
and rather high levels of working capital wanting to hedge the nonprofit 
institution before risk of shortage of liquidity. 
 
Exposition on the risk depends on the kind of mission realized by 
nonprofit institution. If the risk exposition should be higher, then more smart 
is to choose more flexible and more conservative solutions to have better 
results. It works in opposite direction also. The safer mission realized by 
nonprofit institution, the more restrictive and more aggressive strategies give 
better results. 
Nonprofit institution property consists of total assets, i.e. fixed assets and 
current assets known also as liquid assets. We can see that property as fixed 
capital and working capital also. Generally working capital equal to current 
assets is defined as a sum of inventory, short term receivables (including all 
the accounts receivable for deliveries and services regardless of the maturity 
date) and short-term investments (cash and its equivalents) as well as short-
term prepaid expenses (Mueller 1953; Graber 1948; Khoury 1999; Cote 
1999). Money tied in liquid assets serve nonprofit institution as protection  
against risk (Merton 1999, p. 506; Lofthouse 2005; p. 27-28; Parrino 2008, p. 
224-233, Poteshman 2005, s. 21-60) but that money also are considered as an 
investment. It is because the nonprofit institution resigns from instant 
utilization of resources to realization of the mission for eventually future 
benefits that could be used for future realization of the mission (Levy 1999, p. 
6; Reilly 1992, p. 6; Fabozzi 1999, p. 214).  
 
Level of liquid assets is the effect of processes linked to the production 
institution or services realization (Nita 2011). So, it results from the processes 
that are operational by nature and therefore correspond to the willingness to 
produce on time services that are probably desired by final incumbents of 
institution mission (Michalski 2012, Baumol 1952, Beck 2005, Beranek 1963, 
Emery 1988, Gallinger 1986, Holmstrom 2001, Kim 1998, Kim 1978, Lyn 
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1996, Tobin 1958, Stone 1972, Miller 1966, Miller 1996, Myers 1998, Opler 
1999). It exerts influence mainly on the inventory level and belongs to the 
area of interest of operational management (Michalski 2011c, Peterson 1979, 
s. 67-69; Orlicky 1975, s.17-19; Plossl 1985, s. 421-424). Nevertheless, 
current assets are also the result of active customer winning and maintaining 
policy (Bougheas 2009). Such policy is executed by finding an offer and a 
specific market where the product or service is sold. This policy consequences 
are reflected in the final products inventory level and accounts receivable in 
short term. 
Among the motivating factors for investing in current assets, one may also 
mention uncertainty and risk. Due to uncertainty and risk, it is necessary to 
stock up circumspect (cautionary) cash, material and resources reserves that 
are inevitable in maintaining the continuity of production and preparing final 
services needed for realization of nonprofit institution mission.  
Many institutions could act in a fast changing environment where the 
prices of needed materials and resources are subject to constant change. Other 
factors – like exchange rates for instance, are very changeable, too. It justifies 
keeping additional cash sources allotted for realization of built-in call options 
(American type) by buying the raw materials more cheap than the long term 
expected equilibrium price would suggest. 
Nonprofit institution relationships with suppliers of materials, resources 
and services that are necessary to produce and sell final products usually 
result in adjourning the payments. Such situation creates accounts payable and 
employees (who are to some extent internal services providers). We will call 
such categories of obligations the non financial current  obligations in order to 
differentiate between them and current obligations that result from taking on 
financial obligations, e.g. short term debt.   
Required payments postponement exerts impact on reducing the demand 
for these nonprofit institution resources that are engaged in current asset 
financing. Current assets reduced by non financial current obligations (non 
financial short term obligations) are called net current assets. Net current 
assets are the resources invested by the company in current assets equated 
with the capital tied in these assets. 
 
Working capital investment strategies and nonprofit institution 
efficiency 
Next it is necessary to consider the influence of each strategy of 
investment in the liquidity on the rate of cost of capital financing nonprofit 
institution and that influence on the its economic results. 
In the first variant, one must assume that capital providers (lenders) 
seriously consider while defining their claims to rates of return the liquidity 
investment strategy chosen by the institution they invested in. Let us also 
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assume that the correction SZ function graph connected with strategy choice 
could be even and linear (figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Hypothetical shapes of line of correction SZ as a function of 
CA/CR in the SZ1 variant. 
Source: hypothetical data 
 
SZ1 variant. Capital providers take into consideration the nonprofit 
institution liquidity investment strategy while defining their claims as regards 
the rates of return. Restrictive strategy is perceived as more risky and 
therefore depending on investors risk aversion level, they tend to ascribe to 
the financed nonprofit institution applying restrictive strategy an additional 
expected risk premium. To put it simply, let us assume that ascribing the 
additional risk premium for applied liquidity investment strategy is reflected 
in the value of β  risk coefficient. For each strategy, the β  risk coefficient will 
be corrected by the corrective coefficient SZ corresponding to that specific 
strategy in relation to the CA/CR situation.  
The basic risk free rate is 4,5%, and rate of return on market portfolio is 
10%. If analyzed nonprofit institution is a representative of sector for which 
the non-leveraged risk coefficient βu = 0,6. On the basis of so called Hamada 
relation, we can estimate the equity cost rate that is financing that institution 
in case of each of the three strategies in the SZ1 variant.  
      (  (   )  
 
 
)      (       
   
   
)        
Where: T – effective tax rate2, D – institution financing capital coming 
from creditors (a sum of short term debt and long term debt D=Ds+Dl), E – 
institution financing capital coming from founders / owners of the institution, 
                                                          
2
 According to (Brigham 2000) even nonprofit corporations that are exempt from 
taxation, and they have the right to issue tax-exempt debt but individual contributions 
to these nonprofit organizations can be deducted from taxable income by the donor, 
so: “nonprofit businesses have access to tax-advantaged contributed capital”. 
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β – risk coefficient, βu – risk coefficient for an assets of the nonprofit 
institution that not use debt, βl – risk coefficient for an institution that 
applying the system of financing by creditors  capital (here we have both asset 
and financial risk). 
 
For each individual strategy, where CA/CR is 0,3 or 0,45 or 0,6; the SZ 




    (  (   )  
 
 
)  (    ) 
where: SZ – risk premium correction dependent on the liquidity 
investment strategy. 
 
Using that information is possible the calculation of the cost of equity rates 
for each liquidity investment strategy: 
       (      )      
where: k – rate of return expected by capital donors and at the same time 
(from nonprofit institution perspective) – cost of financing capital rate, ke – 
for cost rate of the equity, kdl – for long term debt rate, kds – for short term 
debt rate, km – for average rate of return on typical investment on the market, 
kRF – for risk free rate of return whose approximation is an average 
profitability of treasury bills in the country where the investment is made.  
 
In similar way, we can calculate the risk premiums for alternative rates. 
Next there is possible to calculate the risk premiums for alternative cost of 
short term rates. As a result, cost of capital rate will amount to: 
   
 
       
    
  
       
     (   )  
  
       
     (   ) 
However, for each strategy – this cost rate will be on another level 
(calculations in the table 1. below). 
 
Table 1. Cost of capital and changes in economic results depending on the 
choice of liquidity investment strategy (before the crisis influence). 
 
Liquidity investment strategy RES Δ MOD Δ FLX 
Cash Revenues (CR) 1500 ↗ 1560 ↗ 1607 
Fixed assets (FA) 1200 ↗ 1238 ↗ 1268 
Current assets (CA) 450 ↗ 702 ↗ 964 
Total assets (TA) = Total liabilities (TL) 1650 ↗ 1940 ↗ 2232 
Accounts payable (AP) 225 ↗ 351 ↗ 482 
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Capital invested (E+Dl+Ds) 1425 ↗ 1589 ↗ 1750 
Equity (E) 855 ↗ 954 ↗ 1050 
Long-term debt (Dl) 285 ↗ 318 ↗ 350 
Short-term debt (Ds) 285 ↗ 318 ↗ 350 
EBIT share in CR 0,5 ↘ 0,45 ↘ 0,40 
Earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT)
3
 750 ↘ 702 ↘ 643 
Free Cash Flows in 1 to n periods (FCF1..n) 750 ↘ 702 ↘ 643 
Initial Free Cash Flows in year 0 (FCFo) -1425 ↘ -1589 ↘ -1750 
SZ risk premium correction 0,2 ↘ 0,1 ↘ 0,01 
Leveraged and corrected risk coefficient βl 1,1 ↘ 1,02 ↘ 0,93 
Cost of equity rate (ke) 10,6% ↘ 10,1% ↘ 9,6% 
Long-term debt rate (kdl) 7,2% ↘ 6,9% ↘ 6,7% 
Short-term debt rate (kds) 6,5% ↘ 6,4% ↘ 6,2% 
Cost of capital (CC) 8,6% ↘ 8,2% ↘ 7,9% 
Economic result of liquidity strategy 7312 ↘ 6967 ↘ 6422 
 
Source: hypothetical data 
 
As it is shown in the table, rates of the cost of capital financing the 
nonprofit institution are different for different approaches to liquidity 
investment. The lowest rate: CC = 7,9%; is observed in flexible strategy 
because that strategy is linked with the smallest level of risk but the highest 
economic effect is linked with restrictive strategy of investment in liquidity 
but the best result is for restrictive strategy: 7312. 
 
The expected after crisis changes will correct both the market liquidity 
value and the cost of capital rate. Both factors influence the target (and 
optimal) liquidity level for nonprofit institution. That will result with more 
restrictive liquidity levels because of change in equilibrium point for intrinsic 
and market liquidity values (Michalski 2010, p. 86-88, Golawska-Witkowska, 
Rzeczycka, Zalewski, 2006, p. 144, Jaworski, 2010, p. 366-368). The cost of 
capital will be higher after crisis than before (Fernandez, Aguirreamalloa, 
Corres 2011, p. 4-7, Fernandez, Campo, 2010, p. 4-7, Fernandez 2008, p. 5-
8). That will result with changes in efficiency of liquidity policy for nonprofit 
institutions (as shown in Table 2).  
 
                                                          
3
 Because of exempt of taxation, EBIT is equal to net operating profit after taxes 
(NOPAT). 
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Table 2. Cost of capital and changes in economic results depending on the 
choice of liquidity investment strategy (after the crisis influence). 
 
Liquidity investment strategy RES Δ MOD Δ FLX 
Cash Revenues (CR) 1400 ↗ 1456 ↗ 1500 
Fixed assets (FA) 1120 ↗ 1156 ↗ 1184 
Current assets (CA) 420 ↗ 655 ↗ 900 
Total assets (TA) = Total liabilities (TL) 1540 ↗ 1811 ↗ 2083 
Accounts payable (AP) 210 ↗ 328 ↗ 450 
Capital invested (E+Dl+Ds) 1330 ↗ 1483 ↗ 1634 
Equity (E) 798 ↗ 890 ↗ 980 
Long-term debt (Dl) 266 ↗ 297 ↗ 327 
Short-term debt (Ds) 266 ↗ 297 ↗ 327 
EBIT share in CR 0,5 ↘ 0,45 ↘ 0,40 
Earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) 700 ↘ 655 ↘ 600 
Free Cash Flows in 1 to n periods (FCF1..n) 700 ↘ 655 ↘ 600 
Initial Free Cash Flows in year 0 (FCFo) -1330 ↘ -1483 ↘ -1634 
SZ risk premium correction 0,2 ↘ 0,1 ↘ 0,01 
Leveraged and corrected risk coefficient βl 1,1 ↘ 1 ↘ 0,93 
Cost of equity rate (ke) 21,6% ↘ 20,3% ↘ 19% 
Long-term debt rate (kdl) 15,2% ↘ 14,2% ↘ 13,3% 
Short-term debt rate (kds) 13,2% ↘ 12,5% ↘ 11,9% 
Cost of capital (CC) 17,6% ↘ 16,5% ↘ 15,5% 
Economic result of liquidity strategy 2650 ↘ 2494 ↘ 2244 
 
Source: hypothetical data 
 
As it is shown in table 2, the after crisis changes influence the efficiency of 
the liquidity investment of nonprofit institution. Of course that change depend 
on nonprofit institution risk sensitivity. Depending on their risk sensitivity, an 
additional risk premium for a nonprofit institution that implemented this type of 
strategy should be used. As presented on figure 2., we have stronger risk sensitivity 
than in previous situation. 
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Figure 2. Hypothetical shapes of line of correction SZ as a function of CA/CR in the 
SZ2 variant. 
Source: hypothetical data. 
 
In the table 3. There are calculations for that variant. For each strategy the cost of 
capital rate CC will be on another level. 
 
Table 3. Cost of capital and changes in economic results depending on the 
choice of liquidity investment strategy (before the crisis influence). 
 
Liquidity investment strategy RES MOD FLX 
Cash Revenues (CR) 1500 1560 1607 
Fixed assets (FA) 1200 1238 1268 
Current assets (CA) 450 702 964 
Total assets (TA) = Total liabilities (TL) 1650 1940 2232 
Accounts payable (AP) 225 351 482 
Capital invested (E+Dl+Ds) 1425 1589 1750 
Equity (E) 855 954 1050 
Long-term debt (Dl) 285 318 350 
Short-term debt (Ds) 285 318 350 
EBIT share in CR 0,5 0,45 0,4 
Earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) 750 702 643 
Free Cash Flows in 1 to n periods (FCF1..n) 750 702 643 
Initial Free Cash Flows in year 0 (FCFo) -1425 -1589 -1750 
SZ risk premium correction 2 0,1 0,001 
Leveraged and corrected risk coefficient βl 2,8 1 0,93 
Cost of equity rate (ke) 19,8% 10,1% 9,6% 
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Long-term debt rate (kdl) 14,2% 6,9% 6,7% 
Short-term debt rate (kds) 9,9% 6,4% 6,2% 
Cost of capital (CC) 15,7% 8,2% 7,8% 
Economic result of liquidity strategy 3340 6967 6457 
 
Source: hypothetical data 
 
In similar way we can calculate for situation with higher after crisis cost of 
capital rates levels. The result is presented in table 4. 
 
Table 4. Cost of capital and changes in economic results depending on the 
choice of liquidity investment strategy (after the crisis influence). 
 
Liquidity investment strategy RES MOD FLX 
Cash Revenues (CR) 1400 1456 1500 
Fixed assets (FA) 1120 1156 1184 
Current assets (CA) 420 655 900 
Total assets (TA) = Total liabilities (TL) 1540 1811 2083 
Accounts payable (AP) 210 328 450 
Capital invested (E+Dl+Ds) 1330 1483 1634 
Equity (E) 798 890 980 
Long-term debt (Dl) 266 297 327 
Short-term debt (Ds) 266 297 327 
EBIT share in CR 0,5 0,45 0,4 
Earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) 700 655 600 
Free Cash Flows in 1 to n periods (FCF1..n) 700 655 600 
Initial Free Cash Flows in year 0 (FCFo) -1330 -1483 -1634 
SZ risk premium correction 2 0,1 0,001 
Leveraged and corrected risk coefficient βl 2,8 1 0,93 
Cost of equity rate (ke) 47% 20,3% 18,9% 
Long-term debt rate (kdl) 40% 14,2% 13,2% 
Short-term debt rate (kds) 27% 12,5% 11,8% 
Cost of capital (CC) 39% 16,6% 15,4% 
Economic result of liquidity strategy 473 2494 2269 
 
Source: hypothetical data 
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Conclusions 
Depending on the nonprofit institution business type, sensibility to 
liquidity financing method risk might vary a lot. Character of nonprofit 
institution mission also determines the best strategy that should be chosen. 
The best choice is that with the adequate cost of financing and highest 
economic result of liquidity strategy.  
 
Figure 3. Model influence of the current assets investing strategy choice on the key 
performance indicators in nonprofit organization. 
 
Source: own proposal. 
where: NPO – nonprofit institution 
 
This depends on the structure of financing costs. The lower the financing 
cost, the higher effectiveness of nonprofit institution activity measured by the 
economic result of liquidity strategy. The institution choosing between 
various solutions in liquidity needs to decide what level of risk is acceptable 
for her owners and capital suppliers. It was shown in solutions presented in 
that paper. If the risk exposition is higher, will be preferred more safe 
solution. That choice results with cost of financing consequences. In this 
paper, we considered that relation between risk and expected benefits from the 
liquidity decision and its results on financing costs for the nonprofit institution 
and economic result of liquidity strategy. 
Although, liquid assets maintained in the nonprofit institution is not a 
source of any special interests and although the close to cash assesses together 
with credit lines available for nonprofit institution are connected with 
resigning from realization of the part of incomes or costs, nonprofit 
institutions could decide to maintain some liquidity reserves. And not only 
this resulting from transactional needs, but also from precautional and 
speculative reasons. Precautional liquidity results from a will to protect 
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oneself against higher costs connected with impossible to predict negative 
economic events. It should be assessed from safeguard’s point of view. 
However, investment in liquid reserves resulting from speculative demand for 
money may be assessed by usage a call option approach. In his paper, each of 
the above-mentioned aspects of liquidity was taken into consideration and 
presented. Pondering option liquidity value six factors most influencing it 
were pointed out. Further analysis of the liquidity value problem would aim 
At finding the credible methods of its determination. The nonprofit institution 
liquidity value determination may often significantly contribute to the solution 
of working capital management problems. 
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